The Skeptic الشكاك

491 Is That Egg on Your Face?

A lot of traffic today on the US National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran’s Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities. Here are the NIE’s key findings:

We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program; we also assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons. We judge with high confidence that the halt, and Tehran’s announcement of its decision to suspend its declared uranium enrichment program and sign an Additional Protocol to its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Safeguards Agreement, was directed primarily in response to increasing international scrutiny and pressure resulting from exposure of Iran’s previously undeclared nuclear work.

• We assess with high confidence that until fall 2003, Iranian military entities were working under government direction to develop nuclear weapons.
• We judge with high confidence that the halt lasted at least several years. (Because of intelligence gaps discussed elsewhere in this Estimate, however, DOE and the NIC assess with only moderate confidence that the halt to those activities represents a halt to Iran’s entire nuclear weapons program.)
• We assess with moderate confidence Tehran had not restarted its nuclear weapons program as of mid-2007, but we do not know whether it currently intends to develop nuclear weapons.
• We continue to assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Iran does not currently have a nuclear weapon.
• Tehran’s decision to halt its nuclear weapons program suggests it is less determined to develop nuclear weapons than we have been judging since 2005.
• Our assessment that the program probably was halted primarily in response to international pressure suggests Iran may be more vulnerable to influence on the issue than we judged previously. [Full PDF of Press Release]

Check out page 9 of that document, which includes a handy table highlighting the differences between the 2005 IC Estimate and this NIE’s findings:

2005 IC Estimate	2007 National Intelligence Estimate
Assess with high confidence that Iran currently is determined to develop nuclear weapons despite its international obligations and international pressure, but we do not assess that Iran is immovable.	Judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program. Judge with high confidence that the halt lasted at least several years. (DOE and the NIC have moderate confidence that the halt to those activities represents a halt to Iran’s entire nuclear weapons program.) Assess with moderate confidence Tehran had not restarted its nuclear weapons program as of mid-2007, but we do not know whether it currently intends to develop nuclear weapons. Judge with high confidence that the halt was directed primarily in response to increasing international scrutiny and pressure resulting from exposure of Iran’s previously undeclared nuclear work. Assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons.
We have moderate confidence in projecting when Iran is likely to make a nuclear weapon; we assess that it is unlikely before early-to-mid next decade.	We judge with moderate confidence that the earliest possible date Iran would be technically capable of producing enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) for a weapon is late 2009, but that this is very unlikely. We judge with moderate confidence Iran probably would be technically capable of producing enough HEU for a weapon sometime during the 2010-2015 time frame. (INR judges that Iran is unlikely to achieve this capability before 2013 because of foreseeable technical and programmatic problems.)
Iran could produce enough fissile material for a weapon by the end of this decade if it were to make more rapid and successful progress than we have seen to date.	We judge with moderate confidence that the earliest possible date Iran would be technically capable of producing enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) for a weapon is late 2009, but that this is very unlikely.

Lots of unanswered questions here (Why the change? Why now? How to account for the administration’s stance over the past months when they were presumably getting the intelligence that eventually formed this consensus?), and I’m sure they’ll be well covered in the press over the weeks to come.

But in the meantime, I can’t resist noticing the egg on the face of Israeli Ambassador Sallai Meridor, who spent the weekend warning Washington that “time is running out” for the United States and Israel to do something about Iran’s nuclear weapons program. As Shmuel Rosner and Aluf Benn wrote last night: “The official report blew up in his face: Time is not running out, the Iranians are not making progress, and Israel may come to be seen as a panic-stricken rabbit.”

Which leads me to the egg on the Washington Institute for Near East Policy‘s face. They chose an unfortunate day to release a report by Chuck Freilich, “U.S.-Israeli Dialogue on Iran’s Nuclear Program.” Freilich concludes:

Serious obstacles exist to a true bilateral U.S.-Israeli dialogue on what is arguably the most important issue they have ever faced together. By the time the two countries overcome these obstacles, the risk exists that they will be too late to realize fully the benefits of joint consultation, both in terms of the means of preventing Iran from achieving an operational capability and of adopting joint measures for living with a nuclear Iran.

Reading the NIE alongside WINEP’s conclusions might well lead policymakers to conclude that these “serious obstacles” are a good thing. As The Australian quipped in its headline: “Hawks See the End is NIE.”

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1. Well, In Israel we view this report very seriously.
   It was the first headline in every news show last night.
   To the report it self, i personally view it as flaued.
   Although, of cours there is a big chance that it’s not, and i’m wrong.
   I’ll give your the reasons why I think it have some problems:
   1) You gotta put in the writer’s mixture the intelligance failure of Iraq.
   There might be a very small chance, that after the Iraq war the American Intelligance dont want to give the president another reason to go to war.
   2) You gotta remember that the Americans are not all knowing, especially in the Middle East.
   When you view Israel’s intelligance history versus American intelligance, Israel’s is far better, since we’re committing a lot more resources into it.
   And, American intelligance is a lot more technical, they dont have good HUMIT (Human Intelligance) in Iran. Just cheak their HUMIT failures during the Cold War.
   And on the other hand, you gotta look at Israel’s HUMIT history in ME, which is much better.
   The American dont have “Top Agents” in the Iranian system, let’s put it that way.
   3) There is a paradox in the report. If the Iranians stop building a bomb, why did they contacted A.Q Khan and got his bomb and centrifuge design. Why dont they want to stop their Uranium enrichment?
   In the buttom line, I think the Iranians are laughting at the west and the arab world all the way to their atomic bomb.
   This report is a big big problem in terms of public opinion. And it can harm West’s abillity to convince Russia and China to support more Sanctios against Iran.

   Comment by Shavit69 — December 5, 2007 #

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